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Professor Gilbert R. Winham's International Trade and the Tokyo
Round Negotiation is a comprehensive political history of the vast net-
work of negotiations launched by a ministerial trade declaration in To-
kyo in 1973 and concluded in 1979. The book's publication in 1986 is
auspicious, since in September 1986 another ministerial trade confer-
ence-this time in Punta del Este, Uruguay-culminated in a new decla-
ration launching an even more sweeping "round" of multilateral trade
negotiations (MTNs). Winham's reconstruction of the major develop-
ments of the Tokyo Round, in particular his insightful analysis of the
processes through which consensus was sought and often but not always
achieved, provide useful background for an understanding of the current
Uruguay Round negotiations and perhaps some foreshadowing of future
developments.
I. Background to the Tokyo Round
Winham places his subject in historical context by describing the es-
tablishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in
1947. The agreement began as a set of rules on international trade. Af-
ter the U.S. Congress refused to approve the charter of a planned Inter-
national Trade Organization, however, the GATT became an
organization as well as a body of rules. It aims to facilitate trade through
openness and transparency of rules and procedures and to establish non-
discriminatory trade practices among nations. While the GATT itself
has been amended over the years, the rounds of MTNs held under its
auspices have been a major force in the effort to liberalize trade. The first
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six rounds focused exclusively on reducing tariffs, the most visible and
easily quantifiable barriers to trade. Of these, the sixth, or Kennedy,
round was particularly important: unlike the five earlier rounds, which
had consisted primarily of piecemeal horse-trades on specific tariffs, it
produced across-the-board tariff cuts on most manufactured goods.
The seventh, or Tokyo, round departed in a fundamental way from its
predecessors. Winham explains that while it too pursued tariff reduc-
tions, its main goal was to reduce the less visible but often more perni-
cious non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade. Discriminatory government
procurement, inconsistent and unnecessarily trade-distortive health and
safety standards, and protectionist customs valuation methods are no less
harmful to free trade than blatant tariffs. The Tokyo Round culminated
in the adoption of a series of codes prescribing rules aimed at reducing
these NTBs or at least at making them more transparent. These codes
deal primarily with dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures,
government procurement, product standards, licensing, and customs
valuation.
Winham sets out the major issues at stake, identifies key governmental
and individual actors, and notes the developments in negotiations for
each major subject of the Tokyo Round. After charting the progress of
the Geneva talks and the causes of major delays, he describes how the
hurdles to progress-such as an unfavorable economic and political envi-
ronment and procedural and substantive disagreements-were overcome,
or, as in the case of the failed Safeguards Code, proved insurmountable.
Finally, and most interestingly, Winham traces the relationship between
the internal political developments within some of the participating gov-
ernments and the multilateral and bilateral negotiating positions that
these governments took.
II. Continuing Agricultural Trade Problems
The discussion of the negotiations on agricultural trade illustrates both
Winham's approach throughout the book and the relevance of his obser-
vations to the current Uruguay Round negotiations. With marked un-
derstatement, Winham notes: "So it is that problems not fully resolved
in international negotiations often cause difficulties at a later date."'
Though he is here referring to negotiations on customs valuation,
Winham makes precisely the same point when analyzing the Kennedy
and Tokyo Round negotiations on agricultural trade.
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Winham then discusses the reasons why agricultural issues tend to re-
appear and be so divisive.2 First, agriculture tends to be viewed as a
social rather than an economic problem because of the implications of
agricultural production for the geographic distribution of populations.
For example, a "failed" agricultural policy often results in population
migrations from rural areas to cities, exacerbating existing urban
problems. Second, agricultural interest groups are over-represented in
the electoral politics of many democratic countries and are able to exer-
cise a disproportionate degree of influence on their own behalf. Agricul-
tural interest groups have been an effective lobby in economic and trade
affairs, thus ensuring a dominant role for agriculture in the economic
policy-making of most trading nations.
Winham goes on to examine the dynamics of the longstanding adver-
sarial relationship between the United States and the European Commu-
nity (E.C.) on agricultural issues.3 As an agricultural exporter, the
United States has long been a principal demandeur of agricultural con-
cessions. Conversely, as a net importer of agricultural products since the
late nineteenth century, Europe has long sought to protect domestic pro-
ducers by resisting freer trade in agriculture. Opposing economic inter-
ests have been reinforced by ideological differences; while the United
States, particularly under the current Administration, has traditionally
been suspicious of the role of government in economic activity, most Eu-
ropean countries are accustomed to active and extensive governmental
intervention of this kind. Winham notes that recent developments have
exacerbated existing U.S.-E.C. differences on agriculture. As its farm
economy has deteriorated and agricultural exports have declined, the
United States has become more aggressive in its demands for less unfair
governmental interference in agriculture and for more access to foreign
markets. At the same time, the E.C.'s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) has proven instrumental in cementing the expanding European
Community.4 The CAP has also enhanced the influence of the Commis-
sion of the European Communities, which sets the target price for com-
modities under CAP,5 vis-a-vis other E.C. agencies. As a result, there
has been even sharper resistance to suggestions that the policy be
modified.
After exploring in general the reasons why agricultural trade problems
recur and characterizing in particular the U.S.-E.C. relationship on agri-
2. Pp. 146-55.
3. See pp. 148-51.
4. See p. 95.




cultural issues, Winham provides background information on the need
for agreement in the agricultural area at the time of the Tokyo Round.
He notes that the successes of the Kennedy Round in achieving across-
the-board tariff cuts were largely confined to manufactured products.
With regard to both trade coverage and tariff reductions, concessions
were less extensive for agricultural than for industrial trade.6
Winham explains the failure of the Tokyo Round to achieve any fun-
damental changes in agricultural policy. A central U.S. objective in the
negotiations was to subject agricultural products to the same kind of dis-
cipline applicable under the GATT to industrial goods. Liberalization in
the agricultural sector was the ultimate goal. Yet an equally central E.C.
objective, particularly in the procedures surrounding the negotiations,
was to ensure that agriculture be treated separately under the GATT.
The E.C. was unwilling to accept a position in which it might be forced
to trade off agricultural for non-agricultural concessions. 7
These sharp differences existed from the outset, but were papered over
in the ministerial declaration launching the negotiations. Because the
dispute clearly could not be resolved head-on, the participants simply
postponed dealing with it. For the Americans, the declaration stated
that the negotiations "shall cover ... both industrial and agricultural
products"; for the Europeans, it stated that the negotiations "should take
account of the special characteristics and problems in this sector."' 8 As
Winham notes, each side thus preserved its position and simply projected
the dispute forward into subsequent working-level negotiations. The
overall progress of the talks suffered under this burden.
As it turned out, the negotiations stalled for nearly two years-from
1975 to 1977-in large part because of U.S.-E.C. differences regarding
agriculture. The two sides disagreed not only on the substance of the
negotiations, but also on how the talks should proceed. In accordance
with its view of the uniqueness of agriculture and agricultural trade re-
strictions, the E.C. wanted a special negotiating group to be the exclusive
forum for agricultural issues. On the other hand, the U.S. preferred that
agricultural issues also be addressed in the groups dealing with tariff and
non-tariff measures, for example, in the Subsidies and Standards Code
negotiations.9
The parties' inability to bridge this procedural impasse effectively
blocked all major progress in the Tokyo Round. According to Winham,
6. See pp. 154-55.
7. Id.
8. P. 95.
9. See pp. 156-57.
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the problem was finally resolved in 1977, due to the newly elected U.S.
President's commitment to overall success in the Tokyo Round and his
consequent willingness to make concessions on particular issues. Presi-
dent Carter moved to break the deadlock by dispatching his Special
Trade Representative, Robert Strauss, to Brussels to meet with several
E.C. commissioners. According to Winham, Strauss's mission was to re-
invigorate the negotiations by setting a timetable for their completion.
He won the E.C.'s support by accepting its demand that agriculture be
negotiated separately in view of its "different social and economic as-
pects."10 While this compromise was praised for "breath[ing] life" into
the moribund negotiations," it also ensured results in the agricultural
sector that fell far short of original U.S. aims.
Winham's account of the treatment of agriculture in the Tokyo and
earlier rounds of multilateral trade negotiations is thus particularly
timely. One of the principal U.S. objectives in spearheading the drive for
the latest round of MTNs was again the desire to subject agricultural
trade to the same regime imposed on industrial trade. This goal was
embraced wholeheartedly by a group of fourteen countries, led by Can-
ada, Australia, and Argentina, 12 that formed an alliance in August 1986
to fight European and U.S. agricultural trading policies, particularly the
extensive use of subsidies. These countries share the U.S. goal of ensur-
ing that agricultural issues be accorded high priority in the Uruguay
Round. As a result of the efforts of the United States and these fourteen
countries, the Uruguay Declaration includes the improvement of agricul-
tural rules as a key agenda item. The failure of past rounds has thus
served as a prologue to the round currently in progress; we can only hope
that Winham and other political scientists and historians will not have to
document a similar failure to resolve these important issues in the Uru-
guay Round.
III. The Distribution of Authority for Concluding Trade Agreements
Winham's book is highly relevant not only to the substance of the Uru-
guay Round but also to the procedures framing the current negotiations.
For example, he describes the legal procedures used in the United States
to effect a working partnership between Congress, which has the consti-
tutional authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and the
10. P. 166.
11. P. 165.
12. The other 11 countries are: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. These 14 nations account for




executive, which has the constitutional authority to conduct foreign af-
fairs. 13 Winham recounts how Congress's institutional inability to with-
stand constituent demands for protectionism resulted in the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. That bill and its ensuing foreign counterparts
closed markets around the world and contributed substantially to the
Great Depression. To insulate itself from such constituent pressures,
Congress in 1934 enacted the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
Winham describes this development as this century's watershed event in
U.S. trade policy-making, since Congress's delegation of authority to the
President to negotiate trade agreements inaugurated an era of relatively
open trade. 14
The nature and scope of this delegated authority have changed since
1934. Most recently, the Trade Act of 1974, which gave the Executive
authority to participate in the Tokyo Round, emphasized two main fea-
tures: (1) traditional authority (since expired) to proclaim reductions in
U.S. tariffs in exchange for concessions agreed to by trading partners;
and (2) authority (effective until January 3, 1988) to submit non-tariff
trade agreements, negotiated with Congress's blessing, for its approval
under fast track procedures.' 5 While fast track procedures do not guar-
antee congressional approval of a negotiated agreement, they at least en-
sure expedited treatment by limiting the time for consideration in
congressional committees and on the chamber floors and by precluding
amendment of the implementing legislation accompanying the agree-
ment. Earlier U.S. trade negotiators were hampered by their inability to
foresee the extent of changes in U.S. law that could be required by new
non-tariff agreements. Another obstacle was the need to balance Con-
gress's role as regulator of foreign commerce with the President's role as
conductor of foreign affairs.
Winham relates how some members of Congress were concerned by
the fast track, complaining, in the words of one Senator, that it simply is
"not the way we make laws."' 16 That concern remains today. During a
Senate Finance Committee session last October, a retiring committee
member expressed strong reservations about the fast track. In his view,
Congress had, with this procedure, delegated too much of its legislative
power over trade by ascribing greater authority to the Senate Finance
13. This subject is covered in more detail in I. M. Destler's recently published AMERICAN
TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS (1986), and in Harold Koh's Congressional Con-
trols on Presidential Trade Policymaking After INS. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1191 (1986).
14. See pp. 35-42.
15. See pp. 133-37.
16. P. 136.
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and House Ways and Means Committees and denying all members the
prerogative of formally offering and debating amendments to legislation
submitted by the President.17
As introduced, the Senate omnibus trade bill '8 reflects this concern
about the fast track. The bill would provide the executive branch with
less rather than more authority to implement trade agreements. It would
encrust the original fast track procedure with an additional layer of con-
gressional review to protect congressional prerogatives. It would thus
preclude the President from using the fast track procedure to obtain leg-
islation to implement trade agreements unless he first obtained congres-
sional approval (itself on a fast track) of executive statements describing
the policy to be pursued in international trade negotiations. Such ap-
proval, by concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress, would then
entitle the President to use the fast track procedure for up to five years.
In my opinion, the Senate omnibus trade bill essentially offers only a
fast track to a fast track. The new bill would skew heavily in Congress's
favor the careful balance achieved between Congress and the President in
the Trade Act of 1974. It would give Congress not just two but three
bites at the trade negotiating apple: first, in enacting the bill; second, in
subsequently considering executive policy statements; and third, in vot-
ing on any implementing legislation accompanying a trade agreement.
Such additional congressional involvement gives Congress greater oppor-
tunities to pressure the Administration into offering fewer concessions to
and seeking further concessions from other governments in the course of
negotiations. The limited and delayed fast track authority proposed in
the bill as introduced would thus undermine the confidence of America's
trading partners that trade agreements negotiated by the Administration
would be implemented by Congress. In the background would remain
the specter of the Kennedy Round debacle in which the U.S. Executive
negotiated two agreements-the 1967 Antidumping Code and the repeal
of the American Selling Price method of customs valuation-which Con-
gress later refused to implement.
However, because executive authority to reduce tariffs has already ex-
pired and authority to use the fast track procedures for non-tariff agree-
ments expires early in 1988, new authority is needed for negotiations in
the Uruguay Round and beyond. The Administration's competitiveness
bil1 9 includes trade measures that would both provide tariff proclama-
17. Markup Proceedings on S. 1860, Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 1986).
18. S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).




tion authority and make the fast track procedures for non-tariff agree-
ments permanent.
IV. The Uruguay Round and Beyond
Winham makes several points relevant both to the current Uruguay
Round and to its predecessors. First, he appropriately notes that trade
negotiations are not confined to formal rounds. They continue in the
interlude between rounds, with trading partners resolving issues and con-
cluding agreements whenever and wherever possible. Trade negotiations
actually comprise only part of the broader policy process in which they
are rooted.20
For example, multilateral negotiations about subsidies did not cease
with the conclusion in 1979 of the Subsidies Code.21 Both before and
since that time, the United States has steadily pursued the use of export
credits-financing provided to a foreign buyer of domestic products-at
subsidized interest rates. While the coverage of export credits by the
Subsidies Code has been explored in U.S. countervailing duty cases,22 the
United States simultaneously has sought to increase controls on the use
of export credits by developed countries through negotiations in the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These
negotiations have led to the conclusion of the OECD Arrangement on
the Use of Officially Sponsored Export Credits.
23
More generally, broad-based trade discussions occur regularly through
such meetings as the 1982 Geneva Ministerial. While no one expected
sweeping new agreements to be concluded at or as a result of that meet-
ing, it obviously contributed to the ongoing trade dialogue and thus laid
a foundation for later negotiations.
20. See p. 58. The continuation of trade negotiations outside the context of formal rounds
prompted the Reagan Administration to propose that the grant of fast track authority for non-
tariff barrier agreements be made permanent. In the section-by-section analysis accompanying
its bill, the Administration noted:
In addition [to the Uruguay Round], the United States must also be prepared for negotia-
tions outside the framework of that round and for the period after its conclusion.... The
Administration, therefore, proposes... : permanent authority for the President to enter
into non-tariff barrier agreements, subject to fast track approval by Congress of such
agreements and implementing legislation ....
The Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987, H.R. Doc. No. 33, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 433 (1987).
21. Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619.
22. See, e.g., Railcars from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6,569 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final
determination).
23. Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (O.E.C.D. 1986)
(unpublished agreement on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
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Interim negotiations also continue through bilateral or multilateral
agreements which can facilitate a future MTN round by serving as a
model or test case. For example, an agreement concluded by the United
States and Korea last year on the adequate protection of intellectual
property rights has helped establish a standard in this rapidly developing
area.24 In 1985, the United States and Israel concluded a free trade
agreement authorized by article XXIV of the GATT that should demon-
strate the benefits of more open markets. 25 A similar free trade agree-
ment between the United States and Canada is currently under
negotiation. While a comprehensive, multilateral free trade agreement is
an unrealistic goal for MTNs, bilateral free trade agreement negotia-
tions-such as those with Israel and Canada-tend to prod the interna-
tional trade community towards increasingly liberal multilateral
agreements.
The recognition that trade negotiations continue both between and be-
yond rounds may lead one to question the significance of any particular
round. Winham anticipates this inquiry and responds that the inaugura-
tion and pendency of a formal round serve several purposes. First, their
size and sweep make large-scale negotiations highly visible, thus possibly
affording some political advantages to the participants. Second, the
existence of ongoing negotiations imparts urgency to the problems being
addressed and enhances the authority of the process itself. Finally, the
majesty of the endeavor heightens the legitimacy of the results. 26 These
phenomena doubtless will affect the course of the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations. Its participants will seek not only to improve old rules such as
those dealing with dispute settlement and trade in agriculture, but also to
establish new rules governing such areas as trade in services, trade-re-
lated investment measures, and adequate protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights.
The dynamics of the new round are already emerging. Prior to the
September 1986 trade ministerial meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay,
the United States expressed its view that trade in services should be a
vital agenda item. However, a small group of developing countries
strongly opposed its inclusion. But for the extraordinary visibility and
significance attached to this meeting, these countries might flatly have
refused to pursue the services issue. Instead, the developing countries
24. Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, Aug. 28, 1986, United States-Korea (un-
published agreement on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
. 25. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Apr. 22, 1985, United States-






were induced by the resulting pressure, and presumably by their reluc-
tance to be stigmatized as "deal busters," to agree to services negotia-
tions under the auspices of a Group on Negotiations on Services, separate
from a parallel Group on Negotiations on Goods. Furthermore, but for
the same visibility and pressure the United States might have balked at
the prospect of the services negotiations proceeding off the standard
track. Services negotiations are subject in any event to the same timeta-
ble and review, and to final disposition by the same overseer (the Trade
Negotiating Committee), as the goods negotiations.
Conclusion
As the Uruguay Round negotiations proceed, many of the issues that
could not be resolved the last time will undoubtedly be on the table
again. In the new areas of discussion, such as services and intellectual
property, the parties will bring with them the same parochial interests
and political philosophies that informed the Tokyo Round debates.
There is, if anything, even more at stake in multilateral free trade negoti-
ations in 1987-particularly for the United States-than there was previ-
ously. Certainly, the U.S. trade "crisis" has put these issues in the
forefront of public political consciousness. All of these factors make an
understanding of the Tokyo Round essential. Winham deserves congrat-
ulations for delving through the difficult-to-obtain primary source mater-
ials and producing an insightful and cogent analysis. His book should be
required reading for U.S. negotiators in Geneva as well as for all scholars
of international trade.
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